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VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, with its triggering device and
automatic remedies, not only provides an effective means to eradi-
cate voting inequality but also accentuates the breadth and variety
of congressional power under the fifteenth amendment.
THE FIFTEENTH amendment states in section one that "the right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."' It is primarily to enforce that
provision and to supplement legislation previously enacted under the
amendment that the Voting Rights Act of 19652 was passed. The
pervasive ambit of federal power claimed under this act stands in
contradistinction to that asserted under earlier legislation, which
had proved ineffectual in curbing the abuses of voting discrimina-
tion.
PRIoR VOTING RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The fifteenth amendment became effective in 1870, and the En-
forcement Act was passed the same year. After repeating the affirma-
tive declaration of the right to vote,4 the act set forth civil and
criminal penalties against those persons who, acting privately or
under color of law, prevented qualified voters from casting their
ballots.5 It further declared that a person should not be deprived
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
2 79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-p (Supp. I, 1964). Further references
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 shall be made without citation to Statutes at Large
(Stat.) and United States Code (U.S.C.).
1116 Stat. 140 (1870) (codified in scattered sections of REv. STAT. and 42 U.S.C.).
The Enforcement Act was enacted pursuant to the fifteenth amendment, which pro-
vides that "the Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 2.
'Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 1, REv. STAT. § 2004 (1875), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (1) (1964).
5 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 2-4, Rev. STAT. §§ 2005-09, 5506 (1875).
While the Civil War amendments and the legislation thereunder may have been
intended to have a very broad sweep, see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 248-49
(1875) (Hunt, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court strictly construed the amendments
and consequently invalidated much of the legislation enacted under their aegis. The
Enforcement Act was held to be applicable only against state action and not private
conduct. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). Furthermore, only that state action
which was directly aimed at denying the constitutional rights of Negroes solely because
of their race, color or previous condition of servitude could be constitutionally pro-
hibited by Congress. United States v. Reese, supra; see James v. Bowman, supra;
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of his vote where an election officer had precluded the voter from
fulfilling necessary registration conditions." In 1871, the Enforce-
ment Act was amended to add its most significant feature, a pro-
vision authorizing the use of voting supervisors to examine voter
lists, to challenge voters, and to oversee physically the registration
and voting process." This facet of the act, however, was repealed in
1894,8 and most of the other provisions were abandoned in 1909 and
1911.9 The remaining sections are ineffective appendages which pro-
vide no viable basis for implementing the original purpose of the
act.10
No additional voting rights legislation was forthcoming until
the Civil Rights Act of 1957,1" which authorizes the Attorney Gen-
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1888); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876). See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legis-
lation, 50 MIcH. L. Rav. 1323 (1952); Kommers, The Right to Vote and Its Imple-
mentation, 39 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 365 (1964); Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legisla-
tion and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 363 (1953); Comment,
74 YALE LJ. 1448 (1965).
8 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 3, REv. STAT. § 2007 (1875).
Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, §§ 2, 4-6, REv. STAT. §§ 2012, 2016-19 (1875).
828 Stat. 36 (1894).
9 35 Stat. 1153 (1909); 36 Stat. 1168 (1911).
One author has suggested that the enforcement acts generally were arbitrary and
inconsistent with the concept of a peacetime democracy. Several reasons for the in-
effectiveness of those acts were tendered. First, prosecutions under the acts not only
were inherently difficult to prove, but also the courts generally were lenient to white
citizens. Davis, The Federal Enforcement Acts, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND
PoLITIcs 225 (1919). Second, the volume of cases which arose proved impossible for
the courts to administer. Id. at 225-26. Third, the Supreme Court took a far more
restrictive view of the Civil War constitutional amendments than had Congress, thus
frustrating the broad plan of the Radical Republicans. Id. at 226-27. Fourth, general
public opposition to the laws arose both in the South and the North. Id. at 227-28.
See generally Maslow & Robison, supra note 5, at 369.
10 Those sections still in force are: Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 1, REv.
STAT. § 2004 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (1) (1964) (declaration of right
to vote); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 9, REV. STAT. §§ 1982-83 (1875), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1987, 1989 (1964) (federal officers required to enforce the act);
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 10, REv. STAT. §§ 1984-85, 5517 (1875), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1989-90 (1964) (penalties for marshals not executing warrants); Enforce.
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 12, REv. STAT. § 1987 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1991 (1964) (fees
payable to persons executing process); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, REv. STAT.
§ 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) (equal rights under law for all persons); En-
forcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964)
(district courts to apply that law most "suitable" to the case); Act of February 28,
1871, ch. 99, § 19, REv. STAT. § 27 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 9 (1964) (written
or printed ballots in elections for Representatives). See Kommers, supra note 5, at
369-70 & nn.22-24; Maslow & Robison, supra note 5, at 372 n.42.
1171 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.), Comment,
56 MIcH. L. REv. 619 (1958).
Jurisdiction under the 1957 act was entrusted to federal district courts. Civil
Rights Act of 1957, § 131 (d), 71 Stat. 637, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c) (1964).
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eral to seek preventive relief against any person who he reasonably
believes has restrained or might restrain another from exercising his
right to vote in a federal election.12  While this act did represent
an attempt to give some protection to voting rights, it was not until
the Civil Rights Act of 196013 that Congress took broad action against
voting deprivations. Title VI of this act seeks to strengthen previous
law by providing for the utilization of federal voting referees. 14
These officers are appointed by a local federal district court after
it has found, in an action brought by the Attorney General, that
there is a pattern of discrimination. 15 The referees accept and eval-
uate registration applications from persons in the area affected by
the finding and report to the court as to whether the applicants
are qualified to vote on the basis of state statutory standards. The
referees must also report any unsuccessful attempts by applicants to
register or vote subsequent to the court's finding of a discriminatory
pattern. 10 The court, upon the basis of the referees' determination,
Criminal penalties, not to exceed a $1000 fine or six months imprisonment, were im-
posed only in respect to "criminal contempt arising under the provisions" of the act.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 151, 71 Stat. 638, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964).
The 1957 act had little practical effect, largely because the Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department had difficulty both in getting favorable decisions in southern
district courts and in securing essential data concerning state registration and voting
records. See 1959 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COiM'N REP. 136-42; Kommers, supra note 5, at
377-81.
12 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131 (c), 71 Stat. 637, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c)
(1964).
The issue of congressional power to regulate purely private conduct under the
authority of the fifteenth amendment was raised in United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp.
552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), an action brought against the Terrell
County, Georgia, registrar to enjoin voting discrimination. The district court held
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c) unconstitutional because it purported to regulate private conduct.
On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to follow United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875), which had struck down a similar provision under the 1870 act because it
reached private conduct, and reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court
found that inasmuch as Raines was a registrar and not strictly a private person, he
could not raise the constitutional issue. 362 U.S. at 26. Thus, the entire question of
state action was avoided and the Court indicated it could only be properly raised
where the Justice Department institutes an action against a private person. Cf. United
States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960). See Note, 58 MICH. L. REv. 925 (1960).
" 74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.), Note, 46
VA. L. REv. 945 (1960).
14 Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601 (a), 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (e) (1964).
As the provision for federal voting referees was an amendment to existing law, the
general jurisdiction of all federal district courts to hear cases arising out of § 1971
was continued. See note 11 supra. No criminal penalties for voting deprivations
were specifically created by this act.
11 Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601 (a), 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (e) (1964).
10 Ibid.
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is then empowered to issue an order declaring those persons eligible
to vote.'7
In 1964, two measures emerged to restrict the use of discrimina-
tory devices. The twenty-fourth amendment, which imposed an abso-
lute ban on the use of poll taxes as preconditions to voting in federal
elections,'8 became effective in that year. Further, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,19 although not primarily voting rights legislation, con-
'7 The 1960 act eradicated two impediments to the success of the 1957 act by re-
quiring the preservation of federal election records and by authorizing a state to be
made a party to a voting rights action. See generally United States v. Alabama, 171
F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded, 362
U.S. 602 (1960); 1959 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REp. 137. However, while numerous ac-
tions brought under the act were successful, the entire litigation process took a great
length of time. An action brought against discrimination in Dallas County, Alabama, for
example, required four years from the filing of the complaint to the granting of effec-
tive relief. United States v. Atkins, 210 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Ala. 1962), rev'd and
remanded, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963). See generally Kommers, supra note 5, at 385-92.
In addition, the Civil Rights Commission discerned two additional problems not cor-
rected by the act: the use of discretionary power by county registrars to effect dis-
crimination and the inability of the small Civil Rights Division staff to investigate and
rectify all voting deprivations. 1963 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COAIM'N REP. 24-26.
28 The text of the amendment limits its applicability to "any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Con-
gress .... " U.S. CONSr. amend. XXIV. The practical effect of the amendment might
be to abolish the poll tax in state elections as well, should a state be unwilling to
separate the timing of elections and maintain two sets of records. State attempts
to circumvent the amendment by imposing substitute burdens on voting have failed.
See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (Virginia statute granted option of
paying poll tax or filing certificate of residence six months before election); Gray
v. Johnson, 234 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (statute imposing greater burden in ob-
taining poll tax receipts upon those exempt by Constitution).
The poll tax has long been a source of agitation. See Maslow & Robison, supra
note 5, at 376-78. Transcending the general controversy over its abolition is the greater
issue of whether poll taxes in any form can be abolished by statute alone or whether
a constitutional amendment is required. See generally Christensen, The Constitution-
ality of National Anti-Poll Tax Bills, 33 MINN. L. Rxv. 217 (1949); Note, 28 CORNELL
L.Q. 104 (1942); Note, 53 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1940); Note, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rv. 113 (1946).
The poll tax amendment reflects a constitutionally valid but very limited approach,
in that it applies only to federal elections. The controversy was rekindled during the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and was compromised rather than resolved.
See note 45 infra.
19 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 24, 42 U.S.C.), 78 HARv. L.
REv. 684 (1965).
This act sought to correct two of the most significant shortcomings of prior
legislation noted by the Civil Rights Commission: (1) the discretion given the
registrar under state voting laws and (2) the excessive length of the litigation process.
See 1963 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COasM'N REP. 24-26; note 15 supra. With respect to the
length of litigation, the act provides that either party to a voting rights suit may request
a three-judge district court panel. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101 (d), 78 Stat. 242, 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (h) (1964). The intent is to expedite the litigation process, H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1964), by affording immediate Supreme Court
review and by decreasing the probability of an adverse judgment at the trial level.
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964).
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tained provisions seeking to regulate the possible discriminatory use
of state voting laws. Title I of the 1964 act requires the equal appli-
cation of voting qualification standards to all persons participating
in federal elections and forbids denial of the right to vote solely,
on the basis of nonmaterial errors and omissions in registration ap-
plications. 20 Furthermore, the act sanctions literacy tests only if
they are administered in writing and if a certified copy of the test
and the answers given thereto are subsequently made available to
the prospective voter.21 Where such literacy tests are used, the act
creates a rebuttable presumption that a person is literate if he has
completed the sixth grade in an English-speaking school and has
not been adjudged incompetent. 22
The general approach of voting rights legislation from 1957
through 1964 had been to allow a state to establish voting standards
and then, by protracted litigation, to challenge and ultimately to
nullify any discriminatory effect or use of those standards. Inherent
in this approach was the interposition of the judiciary as the super-
visor and guarantor of voting equality. With the passage of the
1964 act, the judicial correction of voting abuses appeared decep-
tively easy, for the only requisites were proof in a court that a pat-
tern of discrimination existed and the subsequent use of federal
referees whose findings would be the basis for a decision ordering
that Negro applicants be registered. There were, however, signifi-
cant weaknesses in this scheme. First, the litigation process was both
long and discouraging. 23 The Government not only had difficulty
20 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (2) (A)-(C) (1964).
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (2) (C) (1964).
It would seem that this provision serves two purposes: it discourages registrars from
discriminatorily exercising their discretion and provides a ready means for proof of
discrimination. See generally H.R. RErP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1964).
22 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c) (1964).
It would seem that the purpose of this section is merely to lessen the Government's
burden of proof in a voting rights suit when the Attorney General is required to show
that a rejected applicant was indeed literate. Apparently, a complete prohibition on
literacy tests was not politically possible in 1964.
28 "Experience has shown that the case-by-case litigation approach will not solve the
voting discrimination problem." Committee on the Judiciary; Joint Views of 12
Members of the Judiciary Committee Relating to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, S.
REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 6 (1965).
"[R]eliance upon judicial remedies has not succeeded." 111 CONG. Rlc. 8184 (daily
ed. April 16, 1965) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
The example of Clarke County, Mississippi, is illustrative. In 1961, none of the
county's 3000 Negroes of voting age was registered, although 76% of the white popula-
tion was registered. The Government filed suit in July, 1961, seeking a broad injunc-
tion against a pattern of discrimination allegedly practiced by the registrar. The
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proving discrimination; it was often unable to convince the court
to grant the particular relief sought.24 Second, there was a corollary
problem posed by the fact that the surveillance of voting practices
was placed in the courts and not in an administrative body able to
act quickly and decisively in the face of discriminatory practices.
Third, there was no provision proscribing the practice of preserving
the effects of prior discrimination by imposing more stringent voting
standards which would be applied equally to all subsequent appli-
cants. Indeed, some courts met this deficiency,2 but there was no
legislative recognition or solution of the problem. Fourth, the whole
approach was the piecemeal progeny of a succession of provisions
conceived by political realities and unrealistic appraisals of their
ultimate effect.
Ti VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
To correct the failings of prior legislation, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 presents a single, unified program to achieve voting
equality. It provides an administrative process which operates
independently of the judiciary in locating and terminating dis-
criminatory practices, thus assuring immediate registration of Ne-
groes heretofore deprived of their right to vote.20  Moreover, the
court was specifically requested to order the registrar to register those Negroes whose
qualifications were at least equal to those of the least qualified white person already
registered. The trial commenced a year and a half later, and judgment was entered
in February 1963. The district court found that discrimination had been practiced
but not in accordance with any pattern. The court issued a general injunction against
the registrar but failed to order the affirmative relief sought by the Government.
United States v. Ramsey, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 156 (1963), amended and remanded,
331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit court in February 1964,
slightly modified the decision of the trial court. Upon rehearing in April 1964, how-
ever, the appellate court amended the decision and remanded the case, holding that
the district court finding of no pattern or practice of discrimination in registering
voters was erroneous. United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964). In the
lower court the Government did not, however, achieve the specific relief it had re-
quested nearly three years earlier when the suit was first filed. For an exposition of the
above facts see Ill CONG. REC. 9461-62 (daily ed. May 6, 1965) (memorandum offered
by Senator Hart). Finally, in November of 1965, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court and granted the Government its desired relief. United States v. Ramsey, 353 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1965).
21 E.g., United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963) (court refused to apply
freezing); United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd and
remanded, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
25 E.g., United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 880 U.S.
145 (1965).
28
"[Tlhe main thrust of the measure is to provide administrative procedures-
as well as judicial processes-to permit rapid and extensive registration of persons
[Vol. 1966: 463
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act circumvents the problem of policing state practices by simply
suspending those requirements which have been used discriminator-
ily.
The most significant feature of the Voting Rights Act is that
certain remedies automatically arise upon the coincidence of (1)
the use of a voting test2 7 by any state or political subdivision28 on
November 1, 1964, and (2) either a total registration on November 1,
1964 of less than fifty per cent of those of voting age or a total par-
ticipation in the 1964 presidential election of less than fifty per
cent of those of voting age.29 Where these conditions exist, literacy
tests and other devices become ineffective as prerequisites to registra-
tion and voting.30 Further, federal examiners can be utilized upon
heretofore denied the right to vote because of their color." 111 CONG. REG. 15081
(daily ed. July 6, 1965) (remarks of Representative Celler).
See Address by President Johnson to a Joint Session of the House and Senate,
March 15, 1965, 111 CONG. REc. 4924 (daily ed. March 15, 1965); 111 CONG. REC.
8183-84 (daily ed. April 16, 1965) (remarks of Senator Bayh); 111 CONG. REC. 9461-62
(daily ed. May 6, 1965) (remarks of Senator Hart); Il CONG. REc. 15089 (daily ed.
July 6, 1965) (remarks of Representative McCulloch).
Even before the Civil Rights Act of 1960, the Civil Rights Commission had recom-
mended the type of legislation incorporated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It
suggested that a system be created whereby the President could authorize the use of
federal registrars to register voters for federal elections. 1959 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS
COMm'N RE. 141-42. Then in both 1961 and 196a, the Commission recommended
federal legislation to curb severely the preconditions to voting which a state could im-
pose. It wanted to limit allowable state standards to those regarding residency, legal
confinement or felony conviction, mental incompetency, and persons with less than
six years education. 1961 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMAT'N REP.-BoOK 1: VOTING 139; 1963
U.S. CxVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REP. 28-29.
27 "The phrase 'test or device' shall mean any requirement that a person as a
prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (I) demonstrate the ability to read,
write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achieve-
ment or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or
(4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any
other class." Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(c).
28 While the term "political subdivision" has no specific denotation, it apparently
is used in this legislation to refer only to a county, parish or independent city, espe-
dally since the voting statistics upon which Congress relied are given in this form.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 55-70 (1965).
2Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(b). The formula reaches the states of Alabama,
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia as well as forty
counties in North Carolina, three in Arizona, one in Idaho and one in Hawaii.
30 Fed. Reg. 9897, 14505 (1965); 31 Fed. Reg. 19, 982, 3317, 5080-81 (1966). See generally
S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 41-70 (1965).
"
0 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(a).
The effect of the automatic waiver of literacy tests is the immediate and complete
prohibition of such testing as a voting registration factor. Hence, persons can qualify for
registration merely by meeting residency requirements and other state standards not
set aside by the act. For a survey of the standards allowed in Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi and South Carolina, see 30 Fed. Reg. 9915-16, 14046 (1965), adding 45
C.F.R. § 801.204, App. B (1965). The suspension of voting tests is absolute in
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order of the Attorney General to list voters qualified to vote under
state standards not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. 31 Also, new voting tests which a state may seek
to adopt are barred unless approved by the Attorney General or
by the District Court for the District of Columbia.32
These remedies are automatic in that they become operative by
the triggering formula alone. Hence they were immediately effec-
tive when the Voting Rights Act was adopted. Thus, those states or
counties which fell within that formula were immediately subjected
to the act's sanctions without the cumbersome court proceeding
necessary under previous statutes. These automatic remedies, how-
ever, may be partially avoided or mitigated. For example, the At-
torney General is to appoint federal examiners only if he receives
twenty meritorious written complaints33 from residents of a given
area or if, upon his own analysis and following criteria set forth in
the act, he believes their use necessary in the particular localityA
4
terms; yet it is only temporary, since a state may regain its power to administer
tests if it can show a complete lack of discrimination in the five years preceding the
filing of declaratory judgment proceedings. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
31 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 7 (b).
The use of federal examiners is technically not a substitute for the state registration
system, although it has that effect. On the basis of the state voting laws which can be
applied, the federal examiner determines which applicants are qualified to vote.
He then prepares a list of those qualified applicants and submits it to the ap-
propriate county official, who adds the names to the state voter rolls. The listing
procedure itself is not automatic, for it must be set into operation by order of the
Attorney General. However, the Attorney General is automatically authorized to use
examiners in the states coming within the triggering formula. See text accompanying
notes 27-29 supra.
32Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5. This preclusion of new voting tests represents
the statutory adoption of the "freezing doctrine." The problem foreseen is simple:
Negroes are largely unregistered because of discriminatory treatment at that point in
time at which a state having permanent registration seeks to establish new and more
difficult standards which, it declares, will be administered equally to whites and
Negroes not previously registered. Although fairly administered, the tests may dis-
enfranchise those Negroes who were previously subjected to arbitrary denial of voting
rights although they could meet the same standards as applied to whites. To prevent
the continuing result of past discrimination, voting standards are frozen until all
Negroes are allowed to register on the same basis as previously registered whites.
See generally 16 HASTINGS L.J. 440 (1965); 63 MicH. L. REV. 932 (1965).
3The Attorney General determines what complaints are meritorious. Voting
Rights Act of 1965, § 6 (b).
31 Ibid. In exercising his own judgment the Attorney General is to consider, "among
other factors, whether the ratio of nonwhite persons to white persons registered to
vote within such subdivision appears to him to be reasonably attributable to viola.
tions of the fifteenth amendment or whether substantial evidence exists that bona fide
efforts are being made within such subdivision to comply with the fifteenth amend.
ment ...." Ibid.
Federal examiners have been authorized for eleven Alabama counties, five Louisiana
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In addition, the state or political subdivision affected can obtain in
the District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory judg-
ment which removes the suspension of voting tests. Such judgment
is to be granted, however, only upon a finding that there has been
no voting discrimination in the area for the previous five years.35
Similarly, new tests may be utilized by the states if they are approved
by the Attorney General or if in an action for a declaratory judgment
they are found to be nondiscriminatory.3 6 Finally, listing of qualified
voters by the federal examiners can be terminated upon order of
the Attorney General or upon an order of the court.3 7 Significantly,
parishes, nineteen Mississippi counties and two South Carolina counties. 30 Fed. Reg.
9970-71, 10863, 12363, 12654, 13849-50, 15837 (1965); 31 Fed. Reg. 914 (1966).
35 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4 (a). A declaratory judgment is not to be granted
if within the preceding five years there has been a final judgment in any court de-
termining that tests and devices were being used discriminatorily within the plaintiff's
territory. For a tabulation of counties in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi to
which this provision may apply, see S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at
46-48 (1965).
Section 4 (d) gives the three-judge panel sitting in the District of Columbia some
additional guidelines in determining whether there has been a discriminatory use
of the tests:
"For purposes of this section no State or political subdivision shall be determined
to have engaged in the use of tests or devices for the purpose or with the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color if (1) incidents
of such use have been few in number and have been promptly and effectively cor-
rected by State or local action, (2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been
eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the
future." Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(d).
In these proceedings the Attorney General is authorized to consent to a judgment.
This provision is seemingly intended to allow an easy restoration of state powers over
voting standards to those political subdivisions which although within the scope of
the formula have not in fact practiced discrimination. See 111 CONG. Rac. 8187 (daily
ed. April 26, 1965) (colloquy between Senators Tydings and Ervin). If the Attorney
General believes that there is in fact no discrimination, it would seem that the county
would need do little more than file a petition for a declaratory judgment. By pro-
vision of the act, however, the court will retain jurisdiction for five years, Voting
Rights Act of 1965, § 4 (a), thus allowing the Attorney General by judicial proceeding
to suspend state powers again if discrimination subsequently occurs.
0 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5.
The declaratory judgment provision of this section is essentially the same as that
provided to restore state power to use old tests under § 4; it must be brought before
the District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting as a three-judge panel under 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1964). The Attorney General is not authorized to consent to a judg-
ment, but under this section he can approve the new qualifications and allow their
applicability without the formality of the state or political subdivision filing the
petition for a declaratory judgment. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5.
"Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 13. An affected area can petition the Attorney
General for such termination. It can also seek such termination from the District
Court for the District of Columbia in an action for declaratory judgment if
the Bureau of Census has determined that more than 50% of the non-white
persons of voting age are registered in the particular political subdivision and
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action to effectuate any of these avoidance or mitigation provisions
can be brought only in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia.38
The act is not limited to the imposition of automatic remedies
and their triggering devices. It also authorizes judicial invocation
of the same remedies upon application by the Attorney General
in a proceeding brought under statutory authority created by pre-
vious voting rights legislation.3 9 Further, the scope of this authority
is extended by the act to apply to voting discrimination in state
as well as federal elections.40 It also establishes appropriate criminal
if the court determines that all persons listed by an examiner are registered and
that no reasonable likelihood of further voting discrimination exists. The affected
area can request the Attorney General to cause the census to be made, and if he
refuses arbitrarily and unreasonably, the District Court for the District of Columbia
may entertain a petition requesting an order that such a survey be made. Ibid.
11 "No court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia or a court
of appeals in any proceeding under section 9 shall have jurisdiction to issue any
declaratory judgment pursuant to section 4 or section 5 or any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any pro-
vision of this Act of any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant hereto."
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 14 (b).
The use of a single court to hear all cases arising out of a statute was previously
upheld in connection with the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. See Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
Two early actions sought to enjoin a particular board of elections from applying
the act; in each instance the case was brought in a district court other than the
District of Columbia. The exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia court
was upheld, and thus the suits were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. O'Keefe v. New
York City Bd. of Elections, 246 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); McCann v. Paris, 244
F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Va. 1965).
The reason given for this restriction is a desire for uniformity of interpretation.
Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1965) (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach). Senator Ervin
disagrees and alleges that the actual reason is the dislike for the judicial independence
of southern judges. 111 CONG. REc. 8960-61 (daily ed. May 3, 1965) (remarks of Senator
Ervin). See also Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial
Approach to the Solution of Controversial Social Problems, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 72.
"Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 3.
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964) contains the fundamental voting rights provisions enacted
in the three recent civil rights acts of 1957, 1961 and 1964.
Prior to the 1965 statute, of course, a court could accord equitable relief similar
to the remedies here authorized. See United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. La. 1963), aF'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). Nonetheless, the apparent intent of this
section is to insure that the act's remedies will also be available against areas not
covered by the triggering formula but which may practice discrimination. In es-
sence, it provides a method for eliminating "pockets" of discrimination.
,o Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 15.
Until this legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964) had been applicable only to voter
discrimination in federal elections. The effect of this amendment is to extend existing
voting rights protection to deprivations relating solely to state elections. Such an
extension follows from the broadened view Congress has taken of its power under the
fifteenth amendment, as reflected in other aspects of the Voting Rights Act.
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sanctions and preventive remedies41 and provides a general criminal
sanction against vote-buying in federal elections.4 2 Further, the act
allows the use of voting supervisors to see whether registered voters
are actually permitted to vote and whether their votes are counted.43
The Voting Rights Act also contains several miscellaneous pro-
visions which are directed at certain abuses related generally to
the voting rights issue. It authorizes the Attorney General to chal-
lenge in the federal courts44 the constitutionality of poll taxes which
are used in state elections as preconditions to voting.45 Further,
" The essential criminal sanction under the act is a fine of not more than $5000
and/or imprisonment for not more than five years. It reaches failure by officials to
comply with the act, intimidation and coercion aimed at voting rights deprivation,
destruction or alteration of ballots, and conspiracy to violate the act. Voting Rights
Act of 1965, §§ 11 (a)- (b), 12 (a)- (c). Another provision establishes a maximum fine of
$10,000 and/or a maximum prison term of five years for anyone found guilty of com-
mitting a fraudulent act in regard to a listing or a challenge. Voting Rights Act of 1965,
§ 11(d). The preventive civil remedies provide for the issuance of an injunction
or restraining order against any person who has violated or is about to violate various
provisions of the act, Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 12 (d), and for an order authorizing
persons listed by the examiner to vote and have their votes counted although they
were denied that privilege by state election officials, Voting Rights Act of 1965, §
12 (e). See note 50 infra.
,"Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 11 (c). For an explanation of this "Clean Elections"
provision, see 111 CONG. REc. 8766-67 (daily ed. April 30, 1965) (remarks of Senator
Williams).
13 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 8. Whenever an examiner is used, these super-
visors may be appointed by the Attorney General and the Civil Service Commission
acting together. They are authorized to enter and observe in places where the voting
and counting are being done. Thereafter, they are to report to the federal examiner,
to the Attorney General, or to a federal court if the examiners were judicially au-
thorized. Ibid. It is to be noted that the supervisor and the examiner are different
officers serving different functions, although the appointment of supervisors is ap-
parently contingent on the use of examiners.
41 "The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of such actions
which shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with
the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and appeal shall
lie to the Supreme Court." Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 10 (c).
15 The poll tax provision of this legislation reflects a compromise between those who
advocated an absolute statutory ban on the poll tax as a precondition to voting and
those who merely sought to prevent the discriminatory application of such a pre-
condition. The essential reason for the difference in approach was the divided opinion
on the fundamental question of whether the poll tax could be abolished by legislation
alone or whether it could be accomplished only by constitutional amendment. The
effect of the compromise measure is to refer that question to the judiciary. See gen-
erally 111 CONG. REc. 8530-33 (daily ed. April 18, 1965) (remarks of Senators Javits
and T. Kennedy); 111 CONG. R c. 8763 (daily ed. April 30, 1965) (remarks of Senator
Mansfield).
Immediately after the adoption of the act, the Attorney General brought actions
attacking the poll tax in those four states still using it as a precondition to voting-
Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia. U.S. COMAI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS AaT... THm FIRsr MONTHS 74 & n.1 (1965). In both the Alabama and Texas
cases, the poll tax was declared unconstitutional. United States v. Alabama, 252
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it forbids denial of the vote to Spanish-speaking Americans having
received at least a sixth grade education in American-flag schools.40
Finally, the act calls for a study of voting discrimination against mili-
tary personnel 47
CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
The constitutional foundation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
lies in section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, which provides that
"the Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." 48  Reading this section much as Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall read the necessary and proper clause,49 the Supreme Court
F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966); United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D.
Tex. 1966). The Virginia poll tax was found unconstitutional in Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), in which the Court held
"that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral stan-
dard." Ibid. While that case was a private action, it would seem to render moot any
further proceedings under § 10 of the Voting Rights Act.
"Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e). This provision was intended "to cure a very
serious situation which exists in the State of New York," where an English-language
literacy test, N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 168 (1), is employed but may be circumvented
under New York law, N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 168 (2), by showing an eighth grade edu-
cation in an English-speaking school. 111 CONG. RFC. 10675 (daily ed. May 20, 1965)
(remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). While § 4 (c) (2) of the Voting Rights Act stipulates
that a sixth grade education is in effect presumptive of literacy, it does not prohibit
a state from imposing a higher level but only requires that the equivalent level in the
American-flag, Spanish-speaking school be accepted for the same purpose. The obvious
intent of this measure is to enfranchise those Puerto Ricans now in New York who are
literate only in Spanish.
47Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 16. This section does not necessarily anticipate
any specific legislation but does call for an investigation of what can be a serious
problem for some servicemen. 111 CONG. REG. 11016-17 (daily ed. May 24, 1965) (re-
marks of Senator Tower). Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), pinpointed one
aspect of the problem: a state law allowing military men to vote only in the county
from which they were inducted.
'
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 2.
11 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter and spirit of the constitution are consti-
tutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 420 (1819). Previous fif-
teenth amendment cases have adopted a similar construction: "Whatever legislation is
appropriate; that is, adapted to carry out the objects the [Civil War] amendments
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain,
and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345-46 (1879). "The sweep of the 'appropriate legislation' clause is no less than the
sweep of the 'necessary and proper' clause." United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp.
353, 396 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
See generally Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
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in South Carolina v. Katzenbach5o recently upheld the important
provisions of the act. 1 Rejecting the argument that this constitu-
tional provision authorizes Congress only to set out general pro-
scriptions to be applied to specific voting deprivations by the ju-
diciary, the Court held that "Congress has full remedial powers to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting."52
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18-23 (1965) (statement of Attorney General Katzenbach);
H.R RaP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1965); 111 CONG. Rc. 15082-88 (daily
ed. July 6, 1965) (remarks of Representative Celler); Christopher, The Constitutionality
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. Rv. 1 (1965), Cox, Constitutionality of
the Proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1965). See also Maggs &
Wallace, Congress and Literacy Tests: A Comment on Constitutional Power and Legis-
lative Abnegation, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 510, 515-34 (1962); Note, 46 MINN. L.
REv. 1076 (1962).
"383 U.S. 301 (1966).
51 The Court found that only §§ 4 (a)- (d), 5, 6 (b), 7, 9, 13 (a), and part of § 14
of the Voting Rights Act were properly before the Court. Id. at 316. It noted that
§§ 11 and 12 (a)- (c) were prematurely raised since "no person has yet been subjected
to, or even threatened with, the criminal sanctions which these sections of the Act
authorize." Id. at 317. Thus, the question of whether these provisions are valid under
present concepts of state action remain unresolved.
As a general proposition, constitutional restrictions are imposed on the exercise of
governmental power rather than individual conduct. "Individual invasion of indi-
vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amendment." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Sections 11 and 12 enumerate criminal offenses for cer-
tain acts antithetic to the right to vote and thus clearly proscribe conduct of an
individual not acting under authority of the state. See note 41 supra.
A provision similar to § 12 (e) was struck down in a court test of the first legis-
lation under the fifteenth amendment. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
A similar provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was challenged unsuccessfully in
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The action was dismissed without a de-
cision on the merits of the constitutional claim, the court ruling that the registrar-
defendant had no standing to raise the state action issue. See note 12 supra. See gen-
erally Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). See also Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black,
Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 219.
United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1966), held that the
criminal sanctions imposed by §§ 11(b) and 12 (a) were void inasmuch as they
attempt to reach private conduct. The court also held that the Government failed to
sustain its burden of proof; consequently the holding respecting the state action
question seems to be little more than dictum.
Final resolution of the constitutionality of § 4 (e), the American-flag school provision
which makes a sixth grade education presumptive of literacy regardless of inability
to read, write or understand English, note 46 supra, also remains unsettled. This
section was held unconstitutional in Morgan v. Katzenbach, 247 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C.
1965), prob. juris. noted, 383 U.S. 903 (1966). The court reasoned that the Congress
lacked the constitutional power to regulate state voting standards. A subsequent case,
United States v. Board of Elections, 248 F. Supp. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), refused to
follow Morgan and upheld § 4 (e), declaring that "Congress pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment was empowered to correct what it reasonably believed to be an
arbitrary state-created distinction." Id. at 321. South Carolina v. Katzenbach did not
adjudicate this issue. See generally note 52 infra.
52 383 U.S. at 326. See generally Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Com-
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This broad view of legislative powers under the fifteenth amend-
ment, however, is limited by the express language of section 2, which
requires any legislation thereunder to be "appropriate." Both in
the Congress and before the Court the Voting Rights Act was at-
tacked as inappropriate, primarily because the formula which acti-
vated the remedies allegedly bore no rational connection with voting
discrimination. 53  The Court, however, was impressed by the mas-
sive findings adduced in legislative, administrative, and judicial pro-
ceedings which reflected the persistence of voter discrimination.
4
mittee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 251-58 (1965) (statement of
Charles Bloch); Hearings on S. 1546, supra at 664-77 (statement of Thomas J. Watkins);
H.R. :EP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-83 (1965) (individual views of Rcpresenta-
tives Willis and Tuck); 11 CONG. REc. 15639-42 (daily ed. July 9, 1965) (remarks
of Representative Matthews).
See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875): "It is only when the wrongful
refusal at such an election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude, that Congress can interfere, and provide for its punishment." Id. at 218. It
must be noted that when the Supreme Court subsequently construed a statute similar
to that in Reese, it explicitly refused to follow that decision. United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960).
The Court also set to rest three other arguments which had been directed at the
Voting Rights Act. It held that the proscription on bills of attainder applied only to
natural persons and that the Voting Rights Act did not therefore constitute "a legis-
lative trial" of a state or political subdivision. 383 U.S. at 324. See generally Brief
for Plaintiff, pp. 35-44; 111 CONG. REc. 8538-42 (daily ed. April 28, 1965) (remarks of
Senator McClellan). Similarly, it was held that the fifth amendment guarantee of
due process was not extended to the states, for they are not persons. 383 U.S. at 323-24.
Finally, the Court held that the concept of equality of statehood concerned only
the admission of the states into the union and did not restrain congressional power
otherwise. Id. at 328-29.
53In disputing the validity of the congressional presumptions underlying the
formula, other reasons for low voting participation have been advanced. In those
areas which are predominantly rural, polling places may not be easily accessible.
Further, a low educational standard among Negroes may clearly contribute to low
voter interest and participation. See Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 15-33; 111 CONG. RFC.
8022-25 (daily ed. April 22, 1965) (discussion among Senators Hart, Irvin, and Long);
111 CONG. REc. 11050-51 (daily ed. May 25, 1965).
"' For an extensive presentation of the congressional findings of voting discrimina-
tion, see Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1447-1534 (1965); S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3,
at 41-45 (1965).
See generally Address by the President of the United States to a Joint Session of the
House and Senate, H.R. Doc. No. 117, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 CONG. REG.
4923-26 (daily ed. March 15, 1965); 1959 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REP. 55; 1961 U.S.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REP.-BooK 1: VOTING 21; 1963 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS CoatM'N REP.
22; Marshall, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoD.
455, 460 (1962); Equality Before the Law: A Symposium on Civil Rights, 54 Nw. U.L.
REv. 330, 367 (1959); Comment, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 390 (1961).
Much of the pattern of voting discrimination has been revealed in recent voting
rights suits. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (alteration of
municipal boundaries so as to exclude Negro from city elections); United States v.
Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (literacy test);
[Vol. 1966: 463
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
It recognized that previous legislative schemes had failed to correct
this "insidious and pervasive evil," and held that no more than a
relevant relationship with voting discrimination was necessary to
sustain the automatic- triggering device of the act. 5 Significant in
this approach is an apparent shift away from the rational basis test
widely used to sustain other legislation.56 While this change in terms
might be viewed as representing the adoption of a lesser test, it
seems more reasonable to assume that the Court has merely restated
the essence of the test that it has applied under the rational basis
rubric.57
Approval of the Voting Rights Act by the Court has sanctioned
several legislative devices which, although advancing the legislative
purpose, challenge existing limitations on congressional power. The
use of a formula which automatically triggers the remedies of the
act allows immediate eradication of state abuses which heretofore
have been attacked only in the courts.58 The act also expressly pre-
cludes direct judicial review of those findings by the Attorney Gen-
eral and Census Bureau which determine the application of the
formula.59 This latter technique is contrary to the general practice
of affording judicial review of administrative decisions, and the
Court's imprimatur may be limited to administrative determinations
of a purely objective character "unlikely to arouse any plausible
dispute."' )0 In the majority opinion, however, Mr. Chief Justice
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949)
(literacy test and good character requirement).
r' 383 U.S. at 329.
56E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302-05 (1964) (public accommoda-
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Communist Party v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 95-97 (1961) (Subversive Activities Control Act);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
Under the rational basis approach, the Supreme Court accords deference to
legislative judgment as long as there is at least a reasonable connection between a
problem within the cognizance of congressional power and the ostensibly ameliorative
legislation.
5 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 79 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, supra note 56, at 302-04.
58 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4 (b). This device is valuable when Congress wishes
only to reach specific areas of the country wherein evils exist. Under the general pat-
tern of legislation previously practiced, Congress would issue a blanket prohibition of
certain conduct. This traditional approach may in some instances be politically
impossible or constitutionally objectionable if valid state interests as well as illegiti-
mate ones were proscribed. The selective device utilized in the Voting Rights Act
allows a direct attack on the harm where it exists while preserving the status quo in
other areas.
" Ibid. See note 72 nfra and accompanying text.
00 383 U.S. at 333.
Administrative decisions are generally reviewable. See Administrative Procedure
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Warren noted that there was a partial substitute for direct judicial
review in that an affected area contesting the application of the act
can seek exemption from its operation. 1 Further, the Court has
accepted a technique which shifts the burden of proving lack of
discrimination from the Government to the affected political entity. 2
Thus, the state must show that its tests or devices are constitutionally
valid, and the Attorney General need not prove the invalidity of those
statutes. Finally, the conditional suspension of new tests prescribed
by section 5 creates a significant precedent for lodging in the At-
torney General or some other federal officer a veto power over state
laws. Congress could possibly utilize this extraordinary provision
to require all state legislators to be elected at large unless the At-
torney General approves in advance a state redistricting plan.03
Circumscribing approval of each of these legislative devices, as
well as the adoption of the "relevancy" approach, is the Court's
observation that "exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate." 64 Presumably the Court was
referring to the situation created by the practice of some states, con-
trary to the clear mandate of the fifteenth amendment, of initiating
and perpetuating various discriminatory devices and the inability
of previous plans to arrest this problem.05 To the extent that these
conditions were prerequisites to the approval of the act by the Court,
the decision has a more limited precedential effect.
Finally, a tangential but significant question arose out of
the act's prohibition of new voter qualification tests. Article
III of the Constitution, as interpreted, allots to the federal
courts jurisdiction over "cases and controversies" and precludes
advisory opinions. 66 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act pro-
Act, § 10 (c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (c) (1964). But see DAVIS, ADAIIN-
-mAxTivF- LAw TREATISE §§ 28.02-.07, .09, .13, .18 (1958).
61383 U.S. at 333. See notes 35-36 supra.
2 See note 35 supra. The Court believed the burden to be "quite bearable."
383 U.S. at 332.
03 Presumably, the source of power for such legislation would be § 5 of the four-
teenth amendment, which is essentially identical to the language of § 2 of the fifteenth
amendment. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
64 383 U.S. at 334-35. In support of this proposition, the Court relied on Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), which asserted that while an
emergency will not create any new powers, it may authorize the exercise of existing
powers. Id. at 425-26.
05 The "exceptional conditions" which precipitated the passage of the act were,
in the Court's eyes, exemplified by the unrest in Selma, Alabama, in the summer of
1965. See 383 U.S. at 314-15; notes 15, 21-23 supra.
06 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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vides that an affected state may enforce new voting legislation
only if found to be nondiscriminatory either by the Attorney
General or by the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. 7 By thus according the judiciary power to strike down a dis-
criminatory state law before it has been rendered operable, the act
seemingly authorizes the federal court to issue advisory opinions on
the legality of nascent, unenforced statutes.68  The Court, however,
held that a case or controversy does exist when the state's desire to
enforce a new statute is impeded by the federal legislation.69 As an
alternative approach to the article III issue, section 5 could be con-
strued to preclude court proceedings unless an adverse determination
by the Attorney General has been made. While the Court apparently
deemed any limiting construction of section 5 unnecessary, the sug-
gested interpretation would limit court involvement to situations
where a controversy clearly exists. 70
THE PoSSIBirr OF AvoiDANCE
The fear of emerging Negro political power may cause southern
communities to continue their efforts to avoid any law purporting
to guarantee voting equality.7' However, the act practically
rules out the use of any techniques of legal avoidance since
the prescribed remedies are applied automatically under the
voting formula in the most notorious areas of voting discrimination.
Moreover, applicability of the automatic remedies is a closed issue
since decisions of the Attorney General concerning the existence
07 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
's Mr. Justice Black dissented to the Court's resolution of this question, for he could
find no case or controversy in § 5. 383 U.S. at 357-58 (dissenting opinion).
GD Id. at 335.
Judicial power to make such premature determinations may be analogized to
the power to strike down a statute as void on its face. See Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
70 While this construction would insure that the court would decide only a
controversy and not render an advisory opinion, it would seem more detrimental
to federal-state relationships. Under the present construction, the veto power does
not initially reside solely with an administrative official but is shared with a court,
which presumably will be more concerned with the constitutional limitations than
with the success of the legislation.
73 One source of discrimination that the act seeks to reach but possibly cannot is
intimidation, both physical and economic. Criminal and civil sanctions are indeed
provided under the act as well as under state laws. However, they will be effective
only if adequate federal or responsible police protection is provided. Defeating this
threat to voting equality will fall largely to responsible white citizens and fearless
Negroes. For an example of the type of intimidation that does occur, see United States
v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1965).
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of tests and those of the Bureau of the Census concerning voting per-
centages are nonreviewable. 72 By requiring the use of the District
of Columbia for all declaratory judgment actions, Congress has re-
duced the possibility of a delay in the application of the act by the
rendering of a specious initial judgment against its validity. How-
ever, the effort to thwart this avoidance technique has not proved
wholly successful.3 It would appear, nonetheless, that the affected
states are bound by the act and must work within it.74
On the other hand, in situations where the remedies do not arise
automatically they may be applied by the court in any suit brought
"to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment."' 7 The
relative effectiveness of this part of the act is dubious since the ex-
perience of prior legislation has shown that proof of discrimination
is at best difficult 6 and since those areas for which discrimination
could most easily be proved have been subjected to the automatic
remedies.77 Further, it is unlikely that the courts are anxious to in-
voke these remedies since they have previously been reluctant to
use the milder federal referee system.78 Finally, courts may not
72 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4 (b).
73 Prior cases in which this jurisdictional technique has been successful are: United
States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd, 880 U.S. 128 (1965);
United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17 (1960);
United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959), vacated and remanded,
267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 862 U.S. 602 (1960).
Actions to enjoin the act were successfully brought in state courts against state
officials in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. U.S. Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT... Tm FIRST MONTHS 76 & n.5 (1965). The decisions in Alabama
were rendered void by a subsequent decision of a three-judge federal district court.
Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1965). Cf., Perez v. Rhiddle-
house, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
7' In the affected area where voting examiners are being used, it seems that a
state or political subdivision can do little to thwart the administration of the act.
The community can harass an examiner, but short of defying the law it could not
impede his work. The procedures the examiners are required to follow and the
acceptable state standards they are to apply have been set out by the Civil Rights
Commission. 30 Fed. Reg. 9859-61 (1965), adding 45 C.F.R. § 801 (1965); see note 80
supra. Thus, the routine process of listing eligible voters will apparently not be
slowed by administrative delays caused by uncertainty as to functions to be per-
formed or procedures to be implemented.
11 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 3.
16 See notes 11, 23 supra.
77 The Civil Rights Commission in 1961 found that there were one hundred counties
in eight southern states practicing discrimination. Those states included Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
1961 U.S. CIvIL RIGHTS COMM'N REP.-BooK 1: VOTING 135. In the 1963 report, the
Commission declared that Tennessee could no longer be so classified. 1963 U.S. CIvIL
RIGHTS COMM'N REP. 21.
78 111 CONG. REc. 8014 (daily ed. April 22, 1965) (remarks of Senator Mansfield).
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deem these severe remedies justifiable in those localities not brought
under the scope of the formula.
However, once any remedy has been invoked, either automatically
or by order of the court, its impact should be substantial, given the
minimization of opportunities for avoidance. When the examiners
are ordered into an area by the Attorney General they are to remain
until he recalls them. If he refuses to do so a state or political
subdivision can have the examiners removed by order of the District
Court for the District of Columbia if that court finds that more than
fifty per cent of the Negroes in the area are registered and that
voting discrimination there has been abolished.79 When examiners
are court-appointed, they will withdraw only upon judicial order.8 0
Further, the prohibition on new tests appears effective as a means
of preventing a perpetuation of previous discrimination. Without
a complete re-registration of all voters, a state probably cannot raise
its voting standards because any alteration in qualifications, although
applied nondiscriminatorily, would have the effect of excluding
from the voter rolls some Negroes who would be registered voters
but for the earlier discrimination. While complete re-registration
might provide a means of circumventing the provision which for-
bids new voting tests or devices, it would exclude numerous whites
as well as Negroes. The feasibility of re-registration under such cir-
cumstances may thus be politically impossible as well as administra-
tively impractical.8 '
"Even though there has been a long history of discrimination in voter registration
in Montgomery County, Alabama, and even though the pattern and practice of dis-
crimination has continued to exist since the issuance of the original injunction in this
case, this Court does not, as yet, see any need to appoint federal voting referees
for Montgomery County, Alabama." United States v. Parker, 236 F. Supp. 511, 518
(M.D. Ala. 1964). See also United States v. Scarborough, 348 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
70 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 13. The fifty per cent escape clause arose out of a
desire to allow a county in a state affected by the bill to continue state-supervised
registration if no actual discrimination had been practiced there. To prevent counties
within affected states having no meritorious claims from petitioning the District Court
for the District of Columbia, the fifty per cent requirement was added. See 111 CONG.
Rxc. 11073-78 (daily ed. May 25, 1965) (remarks of Senators Long and Hart).
Once the examiners have been withdrawn it is always possible that discrimination
could recur. If that situation were to arise, the Attorney General would not be
precluded by any express language of the act from again certifying the need for
examiners.
80 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 13. If the examiners have been appointed by the
court and subsequently withdrawn, that court may nonetheless retain jurisdiction
as long as it deems appropriate. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 3 (c).
81 Attorney General Katzenbach has argued against attempting such a full scale
re-registration inasmuch as the goal of the act is to increase the electorate whereas
re-registration coupled with a literacy test equally applied would reduce the elec-
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Finally, the means set up in the act to challenge the qualifi-
cations of those persons listed by a federal examiner 2 do not appear
to suggest fruitful forms of avoidance.83 When an examiner has
listed any person as an eligible voter, any other person can challenge
that determination before a hearing officer, whose authority is cre-
ated by the act for this purpose.8 4 Significantly, appeal from the de-
cision of the hearing officer by-passes the local district court and
lies in the court of appeals. Upon such an appeal, the hearing
officer's determination is to be reversed only when it is obviously
erroneous. Moreover, a challenged voter remains eligible to vote
until the challenge is upheld.8 5
CONCLUSION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted nearly one hundred
years after the promise of voting equality was first tendered. In-
tervening, there have been several sincere but unsuccessful attempts
to effectuate that promise. Whether this legislation will in fact
torate, although not on a discriminatory basis. Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcom-
mittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1,
at 17 (1965).
While he has not expressly asserted that such a re-registration would be invalid,
the Attorney General has raised the further question of whether such reduction would
not in fact discriminate against the Negro, whose inability to pass the literacy test
has arguably arisen out of the deprivation of his fourteenth amendment right to
equal education. Id. at 16. Compare Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), which
applied the equal protection clause to void a Texas constitutional provision which
denied the right to vote to military personnel who moved into the State after their
induction into the armed forces, a voting deprivation unrelated to race. For a com-
ment upon Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in that case, see Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, the Right to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 33.
112 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 9 (a).
3For a review of the experience under the challenging process, see U.S. COlbt'N
ON CMvL RIHTS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 19-20.
8,30 Fed. Reg. 9860 (1965), adding 45 C.F.R. § 801.302 (1965). The challenge
must be made within ten days of the date when the applicant's listing is made available
for public inspection and must be supported by affidavits of two persons having
knowledge of the grounds for the challenge. Further, a copy of the challenge and
affidavits must be served on the challenged person. Finally, petition for review
must be made within fifteen days of the hearing officer's decision. Voting Rights Act
of 1965, § 9 (a).
815Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 9 (a). The alternate bill proposed by Republi-
can congressmen would have accorded a challenged voter a provisional right to
vote: he would be allowed to vote, but subsequent objections if found to be correct,
could invalidate the ballot. See Ill CONG. REc. 15091 (daily ed. July 6, 1965);
111 CONG. REc. 15089-90 (daily ed. July 6, 1965) (remarks of Representative McCul-
loch); 111 CONG. RiEc. 15653 (daily ed. July 9, 1965) (remarks of Representative Ed.
wards).
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remove all voting discrimination remains to be seen, 6 but the adop-
tion of automatic remedies and the supplemental use of an admin-
istrative process to supervise voting rights should alleviate the basic
weaknesses of prior legislation. The impact of this act upon the
federal system of American government is significant in a wider
sense, for it may foreshadow a similar congressional approach to
other civil rights abuses under the mantle of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
80 For an appraisal of the early results of this act, see U.S. COmm'N ON CIVL RIGHTS,
op. cit. supra note 73. See also Davis v. Gallinghouse, 246 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. La.
1965).
